Evolved psychology and the Research Excellence Framework

I have written about public goods games before on this blog, when discussing investment.  The basic idea is that players can choose to make a contribution to a common pot, that pot is then multiplied and the total divided equally between all players, irrespective of donation size, which can start at zero.  One thing that interests researchers in this area is the dynamics of free-riding and why many people are in fact generous donators.

In principle the research excellence framework (REF), which I have also discussed, is a public goods game.  Researchers within a department submit their four best papers for scrutiny in a public audit and an amount of money is allocated to those researchers following judgement.  Clearly doing the research to write the papers is costly in the first instance, but the hope is this effort will bring future yield.  There are also status implications as performance during REF impacts on league table position and various other metrics.

The REF2014 audit deadline is nearly upon us, and all around the country discussions about who to include in the final submission are ongoing.  As this current process has unfolded it has become clear that only internationally recognised papers will attract any funding (in REF terms papers rated 3* or 4*), anything below this standard will not attract money and, more crucially, will reduce the departmental average and final payout.

From a public goods perspective this means that if someone were to submit 2* papers to the audit they would be making a negative contribution to the pot that would reduce the impact of the multiplier.  Those managing REF returns know this, and exclude such individuals, taking a fairly conservative line on judging 3* and above in order to manage possible error.

Imagine being a person who is told that their body of work from 2008 to the present day would act as a negative contribution to a public goods game.  In effect they are being told that they represent a departmental loss in this particular scenario - were they to play the public goods game with everyone else, however earnestly they played they would in effect be a free-rider as their contribution would be less than zero yet they would still have access to the final pot of money.

Anecdotally it is the case that many people react badly to being told they are not to be included in a REF return.  A part of that reaction will undoubtedly be caused by conservative judgements that find their work not to be of international standard, a claim that their impact on the discipline is minimal at best.  That can be interpreted as an insult.  But worse than that they are being forced to free-ride.

There is good evidence that our evolved psychology is extremely sensitive to cheating in all its forms.  The classic work of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby started this ball rolling.  Cooperation is a difficult thing to achieve and is very vulnerable to the destablizing effects of free-riders. So, to maintain cooperative benefits we have a keen eye and distaste for cheats.  To be told you are free-riding is very likely to trigger social psychological reactions of guilt and shame in those individuals who are not sociopathic - i.e. who are not dispositionally cheats - and those feelings can be extremely disruptive to social harmony, especially when there was never any intention of cheating and every ambition to make a positive contribution.

If I am right, then REF leads to conservative error management and shame in departments across the land.  Clearly good research leaders will be able to mitigate this, and find other ways for staff to positively contribute and to be valued.  But that task is imposed by this audit in order to offset its costs.

On a scientific note, I wonder if negative-contribution public goods games are possible to experimentally simulate and if so, what behavioural and psychological responses do they elicit?