4 September 2014

Cheating and dogs

In 1971 Robert Trivers published his classic paper on reciprocal altruism in The Quarterly Review of Biology.  This paper discussed how altruism might work as a reciprocal exchange across time between individuals in cases where there is no kinship, or relatedness.  The model he worked out in the paper was later augmented by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), in Science, using the Prisoner's Dilemma.  This paper reported on the results of a tournament in which a tit-for-tat strategy stablized in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where two players had a high chance of interacting again and with no certain end point in the game.  In this strategy Player A would cooperate on the first move and then copy the last move made by Player B. So if B defects, A will defect on the next move, and A will only cooperate again once B does.  I have discussed these issues previously - here.

In the 1971 paper Trivers used examples from cleaner fish, birds and humans. The human section saw Trivers reorganize existing knowledge about broadly moral behaviour and to make sense of it in terms of his framework.  On p.49 of the paper he discusses moralistic aggression, one function of which is to "educate the unreciprocating individual by frightening him with immediate harm or with the future harm of no more aid."  On p.50 he then introduces the idea of subtle cheating and this includes sham moralistic aggression which may function to initiate what he refers to as reparative altruism even when no violation of reciprocity has occurred.  All told, Trivers captures a rich human scenario that would encourage selection for subtle psychological mechanisms that will track social interaction.

One game we all play is the game of wandering around avoiding harming and being harmed.  Driving is governed by a number of laws in order to achieve such coordination, but even driving relies on emergent norms that prevent harm.  Walking really has no laws and yet we all set off assuming that cooperation between fellow pedestrians is the most likely outcome, one governed by various norms.

Yesterday evening I went for a walk with my eight week old son.  He was strapped to my front in a Swedish baby-carrying device.  Early in the walk a large dog bounded away from its owners toward me, and leapt up on my son in a frenzy of unadulterated excitement.  On its approach I called to the owners - "you need to put your dog on a lead."  There was no response.  I repeated - "can you please put your dog on a lead?"  Still nothing.  At this point the dog was upon us and I had to fend him off, grab his collar and force him away from my baby.  I reiterated the need for control and noted that I was with a young infant, at which point one of the owners said - "don't worry, he's not aggressive," to which I responded "none the less, put him on a lead."  Her response to that, as I moved away from the dog, was to say - "thank you for your comments, sir, they are appreciated."

This last comment annoyed me as it was uttered with a sarcastic tone and represented a failure to address the situation.  As a result I said to her - "it is not about aggression, it is about behaviour."  At that point she lapsed into a tirade of swearing and her companion tried to calm her down and took her away.  In response I alluded to her immaturity, and that in common with her dog she was juvenile and uncontrolled.  I was tremendously angry, though soon distracted by a kingfisher fishing at the next pond, catching the evening light beautifully.

Upon my return I mused this incident.  Retrospectively I felt quite shaken by it. I questioned my own responses and wondered what on earth had happened. My conclusions were as follows:

The uncontrolled dog was, at least to me, a violation of a norm.  The owners were defecting by not avoiding harm to others.  In this case the harm was distress and fear - as a new parent my concern was for my child and I was aware that careless actions by the dog could hurt him. Moreover, when I alerted them they did nothing and eventually dismissed my concerns.  None of us know one another, none of us are likely to interact again even if we see each other in the same area.  The conditions for defecting were good.

My actions were those of punishment, or more precisely admonishment. Initially I gave instruction, and in so doing highlighted a norm violation. Later I gave clarification in response to dismissal.  I also physically manipulated the dog. And finally I too was sarcastic. Much of what I was doing was defensive but it also exposed the cheating of the dog owners.

But what did I expect?  An apology and an attempt to control the dog.  If the owners had simply apologized I would have felt okay about the situation, hopeful that they would reflect and perhaps use a lead or go to obedience classes with their dog.  But what really annoyed me was the tirade of swearing, not because I am sensitive to the meta-vocabulary she used, but because it was done to assert what Trivers referred to as sham moralistic aggression.  It was loud and designed to make her look wronged, in need of robust defence.  I won't repeat her phrasing but it was a go away and leave me alone signal, coupled with some personal attributions.  If there had been any witnesses it would have confused the situation, putting my role into doubt, and I did wonder if she had seen others approaching the scene.

I am well aware that my risk sensitivity is high and that I may have misjudged the potential for harm.  To that end the dog owners could possibly have seen me as a problem, especially if they are the kind of owners who think that everyone else wishes to experience the full physicality of their dog. Perhaps to such people an exuberant dog, leaping into your face with no concern for your balance, cleanliness or much else beside, is a gift that just does not stop giving. To that end I must have seemed extraordinarily ungrateful.

I have seen sham moralistic aggression used in professional settings also. Employment law provides a rich seam of material.  If an employee does not wish to cooperate then asserting that the focal task is a violation of fundamental rights, embodied in employment law, is often a good move.  It is an even better move if the claimed violation affects a third party, thus demonstrating an altruistic investment in the company and casting doubt on any suspicion of self-interest. This strategy relies upon ignorance of the laws, to some extent, as otherwise such a claim would simply lead to a legal debate.  It also relies upon fear of punishments associated with those laws, which could include ostracism from a social group as well as job loss.

Strangely some individuals sham very regularly and at a relatively high frequency.  In my experience this works poorly in an environment such as the workplace, where interactions are iterated and there is no clear end point in sight.  Individuals adopting this modus operandi are fairly quickly exposed as shams by management, not least because people start to check employment law and to couch requests in terms that make clear their adherence to the law. So why do they persist?  One possibility is that the initial actions, seemingly to defend third parties, bring those third parties on side and enable a coalition to form that will maintain itself through various reciprocal means.  Often such coalitions will have a shared anxiety or disquiet, which will be enough to consolidate a grouping.  Their concerns may be very real and because of this they are perhaps readily parasitized by shams who claim an interest in their plight, whilst demonstrably fighting the system.  The opportunities for such game play might lead to facultative sociopathy in some people.  My dog owners may give most of their time to worthwhile causes, and be well loved in their neighbourhood, but when out chasing after their dog they set themselves free too.

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